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THE KENNETH M. PIPER LECTURESHIP SERIES
The Kenneth M. Piper Lectureship Series is dedicated to the memory
of Mr. Kenneth M. Piper, who made substantial contributions to the
fields of personnel management and labor relations during more than
two decades of service with Motorola, Inc. and Bausch & Lomb, Inc.
The Lecture Series is funded by the Kenneth M. Piper Endowment,
established by a gift from Mrs. Kenneth M. Piper in memory of her
husband. Major Programs in labor law are presented each year at the
Chicago-Kent College of Law as part of the Piper Lecture Series

38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 112 Side B
03/01/2017 10:44:39

38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 113 Side A

03/01/2017 10:44:39

8 COMPA MACRO EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

1/30/2017 7:49 PM

MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: CONNECTING
DOMESTIC LAW WITH INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS
LANCE COMPA
Note: This article is based on the author’s Kenneth M. Piper Lecture at
the IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, March 22, 2016

I. INTRODUCTION
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1. U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg. at 261, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 18, 1990), G.A.
Res. 45/158.
2. Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (ILO No. 97), July 1, 1949, 120 U.N.T.S.
71 [hereinafter ILO No. 97].
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U.S. immigration policy is a matter of domestic law (distinct from refugee policy, which is grounded in international treaties). This paper asks
whether and how immigration policy makers and advocacy groups in the
United States might take into account international standards on migrant
labor. These standards appear in United Nations, International Labor Organization, and international trade agreement provisions on rights and protections for migrant workers. I do not argue that international standards
should override or substitute for U.S. law. Rather, they should inform policy makers and advocacy groups’ work in crafting immigration law and
policy changes.
Following this introduction, Part II summarizes current debates and
policy divides on migrant labor in the United States regarding both documented and undocumented workers from abroad. It also notes the absence
of international labor and human rights considerations in most U.S. policy
discourse, reflecting a broader “American exceptionalism” strain.
Part III examines three principal international instruments on migrant
labor: the United Nations’ International Convention on Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1 the International Labour Organization’s (“ILO”) Convention No. 97 concerning
Migration for Employment (Revised 1949), 2 and ILO Convention No. 143
concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equali-
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ty of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (1975). 3 In 2006, the
ILO consolidated key provisions of these instruments in a Multilateral
Framework on Labour Migration, 4 subtitled “[n]on-binding principles and
guidelines for a rights-based approach to labor migration” (emphasis on
“non-binding”).
Rather than a lengthy parsing of these texts, this article will explore
their common features and their relevance to current migrant labor debates
and policy discourse. This part continues with a review of migrant labor
treatment in the United States that arguably runs afoul of international
standards.
Part IV moves to a review of experience with migrant labor provisions
of trade agreements—mainly the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 5 the only one that specifically addresses migrant workers’
rights. As binding international documents, these trade agreements affect
U.S. law and policy. Sometimes, the effect is direct, as when NAFTA created new visa categories allowing more cross-border movement. 6 But effects can also be indirect, as when NAFTA’s supplemental labor agreement
included protection of migrant workers as one of its “labor principles.” 7
This gave rise to several complaints and cases under the NAFTA labor
agreement, demonstrating both its potential and its limitations.
Part V reviews arguments for taking into account international standards and applying a human rights framework in our domestic legal discourse, and concludes with a set of policy recommendations.
II. OVERVIEW OF MIGRANT LABOR POLICIES AND DEBATES

Governments around the world have expanded commercial relations
through trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, and other moves to
attract investment and to promote exports of goods and trade in services.
However, the expansion of movement of goods, services, and money does

03/01/2017 10:44:39

3. Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of
Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO No. 143), June 24, 1975, 1120 U.N.T.S. 323
[hereinafter ILO No. 143].
4. See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, at 33 (2006),
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_178672/lang—en/index.htm.
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,,32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
6. See id. at 664-70.
7. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Annex 1, ¶11, opened for signature Sept.
8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
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8. Richard B. Freeman, People Flows in Globalization 9, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12315, 2006),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.5626&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
9. See Alan Travis, Fear of Immigration Drove The Leave Victory – Not Immigration Itself, THE
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/voting-details-showimmigration-fears-were-paradoxical-but-decisive.
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not extend to people. As Richard Freeman notes, “[t]rade and international
capital flows are a larger proportion of activity in goods and capital markets than immigration is in labor markets, presumably because governments have reduced trade barriers and liberalized capital markets, but have
not lowered barriers to immigration.” 8
Defining and controlling borders are seen as essential to sovereignty.
Governments are less willing to cede decision-making on immigration
policy to international bodies. In the great exception to this trend, the European Union has made free movement of people among member countries a
fourth pillar of economic integration alongside goods, services and capital.
But the EU’s “free movement” pillar faces enormous pressure in the wake
of the United Kingdom’s June 2016 “Brexit” vote. 9
Freed-up movement of capital, goods, and services carries with it a
demand for freed-up movement of “talent”—people applying their skills to
generate more wealth in a globalized economy. How wealth is distributed
and shared is a question beyond the scope of this paper. But the movement
of talent across borders is a key factor in producing the wealth.
The term “talent” should not be limited to executives, professionals,
“outstanding ability” O-visa holders, and those in the vaunted STEM fields
(science, technology, engineering, mathematics). The word properly attaches to all workers who bring skill, care, and responsibility to their tasks.
And that means all workers.
In upstate New York, mostly undocumented migrant workers apply
their talent to the year-round care of dairy herds and milk production. Their
work has proven to be a boon to the state’s economy, especially with the
rise of Greek-style yogurt. The same holds true for those caring for upstate
apple orchards, Finger Lakes vineyards, and other agricultural production,
both year-round and at harvest time.
In other parts of the country, millions of immigrant workers—again,
many of them undocumented—apply skill, care, and responsibility in a
broad range of industries. These sectors include meatpacking and poultry
(starting with care not to cut themselves and others wielding sharp knives
in close quarters at rapid line speeds); construction, forestry and landscaping; hotels and restaurants and amusement parks; and other sectors where
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immigrant workers’ labor powers economic activity. Migrant workers,
documented and undocumented, play a key role in important economic
sectors in the Chicago regional economy. 10
What Maria Lorena Cook describes as “the conflict and tensions between sovereignty of the nation-state and the cross-border flows characteristic of a global economy” 11 generate currents that politicians, policy
makers, and interest groups around the globe are trying to navigate. Not
least here in the United States, where on one side candidates for office set a
harsh anti-immigrant tone, while others support comprehensive immigration reform and decry deportations breaking up families and sending women and children back to violence-ridden countries. 12
B. Competing Realities
Contradictory approaches also mark views of employer and employee
advocates, who appear to inhabit separate universes. For many employers,
the United States suffers a dearth of talent. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Essential Worker Immigration Coalition, ImmigrationWorks
USA, CompeteAmerica and other industry and trade associations insist that
we are in desperate need of more immigrant workers to meet labor shortages and keep the economy growing. 13 The American Immigration Council
asserts that immigrant employees with H-1B visas do not pull down wages
of American high-tech workers; they make higher salaries than American
counterparts. 14
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13. See, e.g., CompeteAmerica, et. al., Debunking the Myth that Immigration Harms America,
http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/directory/DocumentSIA/Workforce/19%20Associations
%20Immigration%20Myth%20Facts%203-2015.pdf (last visited January 27, 2016); MICROSOFT CORP.,
A NAT’L TALENT STRATEGY: IDEAS FOR SECURING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS AND ECON. GROWTH 1,
https://news.microsoft.com/download/presskits/citizenship/MSNTS.pdf (last visited January 27, 2016);
STUART ANDERSON, NATIONAL. FOUNDATION. FOR AMERICAN. POLICY., SETTING THE RECORD
STRAIGHT ON HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRATION 1–2, 5, 9, 26 (2016), http://nfap.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/Setting-the-Record-Straight-on-High-Skilled-Immigration.NFAP-PolicyBrief.August-20162.pdf.
14. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE H-1B VISA PROGRAM: A PRIMER ON THE
PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON JOBS, WAGES, AND THE ECONOMY 4 (2016),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/h-1b-visa-program-primer-program-and-its-impact-jobswages-and-economy.
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10. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRANTS HELP SUSTAIN CHICAGO’S ECONOMY 2
(2002), http://216.92.33.26/special-reports/immigrants-help-sustain-chicagos-economy.
11. Maria Lorena Cook, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings,
4 STUD. SOC. JUST. 145, 145 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Miriam Valverde, Compare the Candidates: Clinton vs. Trump on Immigration,
POLITIFACT
(July
15,
2016,
2:46
PM),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2016/jul/15/compare-candidates-clinton-vs-trump-immigration/.
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15. See Matthew Dalton, India Challenges U.S. Worker Visa Fees at WTO: Complaint Addresses
Increase in Fees for Temporary Visas Available for Highly Skilled Workers, WALL ST. J. (March 4,
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/india-challenges-u-s-temporary-visa-scheme-at-wto-1457091168.
16. See Gary Silverman, Workers Wanted: Construction Sector Fights to Retain Foreign-Born
Employees With Citizenship Schemes and Other Incentives, FIN. TIMES (February 8, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/46f78afc-ce4d-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Ken Bensinger et. al., The Pushovers: Bar None: Abusing Foreign “Guest Workers,” Stealing Their Wages, Even Threatening Their Lives: There Is Almost No Workplace Offense so
Extreme that the U.S. Government Will Not Reward Employers with the Chance to Do It Again,
BUZZFEED
(May
12,
2016),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/thepushovers?utm_term=.gy0Vad90Z#.ojwaNJQ26.
19. See Ben A. Rissing & Emilio J. Castilla, Testing Attestations: U.S. Unemployment and Immigrant Work Authorizations, 69 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1081, 1102, 1106 (2016).
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In their various publications just noted, these pro-immigration advocates call for lifting the cap on H-1B “specialty occupation” visas and expanding use of L “intracompany transfer” visas for high-tech and other
high-skilled employees. They want to make H-2A and H-2B visas for
“low-tech” temporary agricultural and non-agricultural jobs available for
year-round work, not just seasonal labor. They want to ease what they see
as overly burdensome prevailing wage and adverse effect wage requirements, job posting requirements, travel cost payments, work guarantees and
other conditions employers must meet to engage H-1B, L, H-2A and H-2B
workers. In March 2016, their views were reflected by the government of
India, which filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization charging
that U.S. visa requirements for H-1B employees violated WTO trade
rules. 15
A recent Financial Times article suggested that there is such a labor
shortage in the construction industry that employers now sponsor migrant
workers for U.S. citizenship to retain them. 16 But the same article reported
(apparently oblivious to connecting the dots) that employers complaining
about labor shortage are resolutely non-union and pay workers as little as
$10 an hour for dangerous, demanding physical labor. 17
Trade unions, employee associations, and other worker advocates take
a polar opposite view. They argue that what employers see as burdensome
requirements, such as demonstrating unsuccessful attempts to recruit American workers as a condition of approval for using guest worker visas, are
easily evaded by employers and weakly enforced by government regulators. 18 Research by Ben A. Rissing shows that Department of Labor officials over-rely on employers’ “attestations” of labor shortages (taking their
word for it, without back-up evidence) and end up granting more temporary
visas at times of high unemployment. 19
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Labor advocates insist that the alleged labor shortage is itself a myth. 20
They say that employers claim a lack of home-grown talent to justify bringing large numbers of immigrant employees into the workforce to replace
American workers, save on labor costs, and maintain a docile workforce
fearful of jeopardizing their visa status. Moreover, use of temporary visas
puts downward pressure on the wages of U.S. workers who manage to hold
onto their jobs. 21
Each side in this debate musters myriad studies and reports to support
its view and to influence public opinion and the policy debate in Congress. 22 As Kati Griffith summarizes:
At the heart of much of the current debate surrounding both skilled and
unskilled migrant workers in the United States is whether, and to what
extent, these workers have an effect on the wages and working conditions of domestic workers. Studies on the effect of immigrant workers on
labor standards for domestic workers arrive at “contradictory conclusions.” Some find that migrant workers have increasingly “caused a major competitive problem” for U.S. workers and may have reduced wage
rates of some domestic workers. Others point out that, at the aggregate
level, migrant workers do not negatively affect labor conditions for domestic workers. Much of this debate centers on “whether low-income
[domestic] workers are hurt a lot or just a little.” While the direct causal
relationship between the presence of migrants and declining labor standards in the U.S. remains hotly contested, there is no doubt that many migrant workers, especially undocumented migrant workers, are
concentrated in low-wage workplaces where workplace rights are poorly
followed and poorly enforced. 23

The H-2B visa program apparently fails to protect hundreds of traveling carnival workers whose jobs are controlled by a spurious “union” run

03/01/2017 10:44:39

21. See Hal Salzman et. al., The Bogus High-Tech Worker Shortage: How Guest Workers Lower
NEWSHOUR:
MAKING
SENSE
(July
24,
2013,
1:05PM),
U.S.
Wages,
PBS
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/the-bogus-high-tech-worker-sho/.
22. On the labor shortage side, see, e.g., ADAMS B. NAGER & ROBERT D. ATKINSON, DEBUNKING
THE TOP TEN ARGUMENTS AGAINST HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRATION (2015), http://www2.itif.org/2015debunking-myths-high-skilled.pdf (accessed January 27, 2016); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE &
IMMIGRATIONWORKS USA, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF H-2B WORKERS (2010), at
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/16102_LABR%20H2BReport_LR.pdf
(accessed January 27, 2016). But see RON HIRA, ECON. POLICY INST., THE H-1B AND L-1 VISA
PROGRAMS: OUT OF CONTROL, EPI BRIEFING PAPER #280 (Oct. 14, 2010) at
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp280/; DANIEL COSTA, ECON. POLICY INST., THE H-2B TEMPORARY
FOREIGN WORKER PROGRAM: FOR LABOR SHORTAGES OR CHEAP, TEMPORARY LABOR?, EPI BRIEFING
PAPER #416, (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-programfor-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/ (accessed January 27, 2016).
23. Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor
and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y. J. 125, 127–28 (2009).
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20. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. TEITELBAUM, FALLING BEHIND? BOOM, BUST, AND THE GLOBAL RACE
FOR SCIENTIFIC TALENT (Princeton Univ. Press 2014).
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E\EXVLQHVVPHQIURP0H[LFRDQG7H[DV  :RUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVRI0H[LFDQ
DQG&HQWUDO$PHULFDQPLJUDQWVZLWKWHPSRUDU\ZRUNYLVDVLQ&KHVDSHDNH
%D\ FUDESURFHVVLQJ SODQWV DUH VKDUSO\ FULWLFL]HG E\ ODERU DGYRFDWHV \HW
GHIHQGHGE\DQRWKHUZLVHVWDXQFKODERUDOO\ 
C. Litigating Migrant Protections
3UREOHPVRIPLJUDQWZRUNHUDEXVHGRQRWDULVHRQO\LQWKHSROLF\DQG
SXEOLFLW\ DUHQD 7KH\ FRPH WR RXU FRXUWV WRR ,Q RQH ZLGHO\ SXEOLFL]HG
ODZVXLW ,QGLDQ ZHOGHUV EURXJKW LQ RQ +% YLVDV E\ 6LJQDO ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
FRUS WR UHSDLU RLO IDFLOLWLHV DIWHU +XUULFDQH .DWULQD ZRQ D PXOWLPLOOLRQ
GROODUMXGJPHQWDJDLQVWWKHFRPSDQ\IRUKROGLQJWKHPLQFRQGLWLRQVDNLQWR
VODYHU\  ,QDQRWKHUIRUPHU'LVQH\&RUSFRPSXWHUV\VWHPVHPSOR\HHVLQ
2UODQGRKDYHILOHGDODZVXLWDJDLQVWWKHFRPSDQ\IRUUHSODFLQJWKHPZLWK
LPPLJUDQW +% YLVD KROGHUV DQG DGGLQJ LQVXOW WR LQMXU\ PDNLQJ WKHP
WUDLQWKHLUUHSODFHPHQWVEHIRUHORVLQJWKHLUMREV  
$ IHGHUDO MXGJH LQ 9LUJLQLD DZDUGHG  LQ XQSDLG ZDJHV DQG
GDPDJHVWR*XDWHPDODQJXHVWZRUNHUVZKRVHHPSOR\HUVIDLOHGWRSD\
WKH PLQLPXP ZDJH RU RYHUWLPH  7KH ODUJHVW VDXHUNUDXW SURGXFHU LQ WKH
8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVIRXQGWRKDYHIDLOHGWRSURYLGH+%ZRUNHUVZLWKZULW
WHQWHUPVRIHPSOR\PHQWWHUPLQDWHGWKHPHDUO\ZLWKRXWJRRGFDXVHWRRN
XQODZIXO IRRG DQG KRXVLQJ GHGXFWLRQV IURP WKHLU SD\FKHFNV IDLOHG WR UH
LPEXUVHWKHLULQERXQGH[SHQVHVDQGIDLOHGWRSD\IRUUHWXUQWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
WR WKHLU KRPHV LQ 0H[LFR  3URVHFXWRUV DURXQG WKH FRXQWU\ KDYH EURXJKW
VHYHUDOFDVHVDJDLQVWZHDOWK\KRXVHKROGHUVZKRNHSWGRPHVWLFVHUYDQWVLQ
LQGHQWXUHOLNHFRQGLWLRQV 
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 116 Side A
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. See %DUU\0HLHUUnion Accused of Betraying Migrant Carnival Workers1< 7,0(6 6HSW
   KWWSZZZQ\WLPHVFRPEXVLQHVVXQLRQDFFXVHGRIEHWUD\LQJPLJUDQWFDUQLYDO
ZRUNHUVKWPO
 See 5DFKHO :HLQHU A Progressive Champion in Maryland Sides with Seafood Companies
over Visa Regulations :$6+ 3267 1RY    KWWSVZZZZDVKLQJWRQSRVWFRPORFDOPG
SROLWLFVZK\DOLEHUDOVHQDWRULVVLGLQJZLWKHPSOR\HUVLQDELWWHUODERUGLVSXWHDDF
HEHEDHHIIBVWRU\KWPO
 See /LDP 6WDFN Indian Guest Workers Awarded $14 Million 1< 7,0(6 )HE   
KWWSZZZQ\WLPHVFRPXVLQGLDQJXHVWZRUNHUVDZDUGHGPLOOLRQKWPO"BU 
 See -XOLD3UHVWRQLawsuits Claim Disney Colluded to Replace U.S. Workers with Immigrants
1< 7,0(6 -DQ KWWSZZZQ\WLPHVFRPXVODZVXLWFODLPVGLVQH\FROOXGHGWR
UHSODFHXVZRUNHUVZLWKLPPLJUDQWVKWPO
 6LTXLFY6WDU)RUHVWU\//&1RFY:/DW ± :'9D
0DU 
 -LPHQH] Y */. )RRGV //& 1R &9  :/  DW    
± (':LVF0D\ 
 See, e.g $VKOH\ 6RXWKDOO Diplomat From India Is Indicted Again over Housekeeper 1<
7,0(6 0DU    KWWSZZZQ\WLPHVFRPZRUOGDVLDGLSORPDWIURPLQGLDLV
LQGLFWHGDJDLQRYHUKRXVHNHHSHUKWPO 0LFKDHO ( 0LOOHU Chinese Nanny Beaten, Starved, Treated

38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 116 Side B

03/01/2017 10:44:39

8 COMPA MACRO EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

218

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

1/30/2017 7:49 PM

[Vol 92:1

A 2011 front-page story in the New York Times about J-1 visa holders
working long hours in abusive conditions packaging products for Hershey
Chocolate Corp exposed the program as a cheap labor scheme, not the cultural exchange experience for young foreigners it was meant to be. 31 The
State Department reformed the program, but the Government Accountability Office found in 2015 that the program continues to lack the safeguards
necessary to ensure that participants are offered cultural activities and not
charged exorbitant fees. 32
In February 2016, a class action suit on behalf of foreign au pair employees holding J-1 visas went forward to trial. 33 Plaintiffs argued that fifteen J-1 visa sponsoring companies colluded to suppress wages in violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage
and hour laws. The court also held that the au pairs can maintain claims for
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. 34
Employers of H-1B visa holders are now concerned about a legislative
proposal that would make it easier for American workers to file lawsuits
against companies who hire foreign employees. They say, “The goal appears to be to produce enough legal peril for employers that they will avoid
hiring high-skilled foreign nationals in the United States.” 35 They further
argue that such measure would “have the effect of. . .encouraging many
companies to expand resources abroad and place more people in other
countries.” 36
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‘Like a Dog’ in Wealthy Minnesota Suburb, Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 18, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/18/chinese-nanny-beaten-starvedtreated-like-a-dog-in-wealthy-minn-suburb-authorities-say/.
31. See Julia Preston, Foreign Students in Work Visa Program Stage Walkout at Plant, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/18immig.html; Julia Preston, State
Department Revises Foreign Student Job Program after Abuse Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/us/politics/us-revises-foreign-student-job-program.html.
32. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-265, SUMMER WORK TRAVEL PROGRAM:
STATE DEPARTMENT HAS TAKEN STEPS TO STRENGTHEN PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, BUT ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS
COULD
FURTHER
ENHANCE
OVERSIGHT,
at
24–26
(2015),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668453.pdf.
33. See Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-03074-CMA-KMT, 2015 WL 7253286, at
*5–6, *43 (D. Colo. Feb. 22, 2016).
34. Id. See also Laura D. Francis, J-1 Au Pairs Maintain Claims Sponsors Colluded to Fix Wages, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) Feb. 23, 2016 at A-2.
35. See NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, THE REAL WORLD IMPACT OF PROPOSED HIGHSKILLED IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS 3 (2016), http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/RealWorld-Impact-of-Proposed-High-Skilled-Immigration-Restrictions.NFAP-Policy-Brief.August20161.pdf.
36. Id.
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D. International Standards and American Exceptionalism
Both sides in the labor-shortage vs. labor-exploitation debate make
compelling arguments. Ultimately, the arguments depend on underlying
political inclinations and angle of approach. Labor advocates criticize what
they see as the misuse of immigration programs. But this doesn’t mean (nor
do they argue) that immigration should be halted. It means that the United
States a new immigration policy that balances the needs of companies and
the overall economy with needs for high labor standards and protection of
workers’ rights. This is where international human rights norms concerning
migrant labor can inform analysis and discourse.
In its 2006 Multilateral Framework, the International Labor Organization (ILO) recognized the reality that member states are not willing to cede
sovereignty on basic immigration policy, while recommending that they
take international standards into consideration:
States have the sovereign right to develop their own policies to manage
labor migration. International labor standards and other international instruments, as well as guidelines, as appropriate, should play an important
role to make these policies coherent, effective and fair. 37
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37. Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, supra note 4, at 11.
38. INT’L LAB. RECRUITMENT WORKING GRP., THE AMERICAN DREAM UP FOR SALE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR ENDING INTERNATIONAL LABOR RECRUITMENT ABUSE, at 5 (2013),
https://fairlaborrecruitment.wordpress.com/.
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But we in the United States have yet to seriously engage international
labor standards in developing migrant labor policies. For example, a 2013
critical analysis of U.S. immigration by a coalition of unions and immigrant
worker advocacy groups concludes that regardless of visa category, immigrant workers in the United States face “disturbingly common” patterns of
abuse including “fraud, discrimination, coercion, retaliation, blacklisting
and, in some cases, forced labor, indentured servitude, debt bondage and
human trafficking.” 38 However, this impressive 50-page report, backed up
by more than 300 source citations, offering eight “core principles” and
detailed policy recommendations, does not discuss the United Nations’
International Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and mentions only in passing related
ILO conventions.
This is not surprising, nor is it a cause for criticism. It simply reflects
the reality that international law and international labor and human rights
standards have limited purchase in American policy discourse, even among
advocates whose newly-proposed core principles have long been contained
in these international instruments. With the world’s longest-standing con-
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stitution, our Bill of Rights, and a rich rule-of-law tradition, Americans
tend to think we don’t need the rest of the world to tell us how to order our
affairs. 39 Practically alone in the world, for example, the United States has
refused to ratify the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 40 and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC). 41
The “American exceptionalism” strain in our law and policy mix is
especially marked in the labor-related field. Outside a small cadre of comparative and international specialists, most actors in the U.S. labor law
system have little familiarity with ILO conventions and labor provisions in
other international instruments. As one scholar noted:
The official American view is that international human rights are endangered elsewhere, and that American labor law is a model for the rest of
the world. The rest of the world may not be convinced that American labor law, old and flawed as it is, is a model for the modern world. But
more to the present point, American legal institutions and decision makers have thus far been deaf to the claim that international labor law provides a potential model for American labor law, or even a critical
vantage point from which to view American labor law (footnote omitted). 42

The United States has ratified just 14 of the ILO’s 189 conventions,
and among the 14 are just two of the organization’s eight “core conventions” on forced labor and child labor. 43 It has not ratified either of the
ILO’s migrant labor conventions, nor the UN migrant convention. 44
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39. See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, at 1567–75 (2006).
40. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378.
41. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 27531.
42. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1589 (2002).
43. See ILO Conventions: Ratifications for United States, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871
(last visited September 8, 2016) (The United States has ratified Convention No. 105 on forced labor and
Convention No. 182 on worst forms of child labor. The United States has not ratified Convention No.
29 on forced labor, No. 87 on freedom of association, No. 98 on the right to organize, No. 100 on equal
pay, No. 111 on nondiscrimination, and No. 138 on child labor.).
44. See Ratifications of C097 - Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97),
INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312242:NO (last visited September 8, 2016); Ratifications of C143 - Migrant Workers (SupplemenLABOUR
ORG.,
tary
Provisions)
Convention,
1975
(No. 143),
INT’L
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312288:NO (last visited September 8, 2016); on ratification of the Migrant Workers convention,
see United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, December 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 39481.
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In the face of American exceptionalism, are we in the United States
ready to examine and learn from international standards and international
discourse on migrant workers’ rights? Here is how Maria Lorena Cook
characterizes the problem:
There are political, legal, and discursive limits on the use of human
rights frames, particularly in the United States. Moreover, much of the
contemporary debate on immigration in the US and other advanced industrial democracies revolves around arguments about security, economics, and law—arguments that are rooted in the nation-state. This gives
rise to the advocate’s dilemma: on the one hand, universal norms such as
human rights, which are theoretically well suited to advancing immigrants’ claims, may have little resonance within national settings; on the
other hand, the debates around which immigration arguments typically
turn, and the terrain on which advocates must fight, derive their values
and assumptions from a nation-state framework that is self-limiting. 45

III. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE
A. International Norms
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45. Maria Lorena Cook, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings,
4 STUDIES IN SOCIAL JUSTICE 145, 146 (2010).
46. See ILO No. 97, supra note 2 at annex I–II.
47. ILO No. 143, supra note 3 at art. 3.
48. Id. art. 8–10.
49. For an overview of adoption, entry into force, and ratification of the Migrant Workers Convention, see International Migration Convention,, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.
[UNESCO],
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/internationalmigration/international-migration-convention/ (last visited November 7, 2016).
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A brief summary of the three major international instruments on migrant labor standards introduces this section and the discussion that follows.
ILO Convention No. 97 on migration for employment dates to 1949
and aims mainly at fraudulent recruiting and misleading information about
migrant work opportunities. It calls for governments to themselves administer migrant labor recruiting services, or to carefully regulate such services
by private actors. 46
Adopted in 1975, Convention No. 143 on migration “in abusive conditions” aims at traffickers and their victims. It calls on countries to “suppress
clandestine movements of migrants for employment and illegal employment” of migrants and to criminally prosecute traffickers. 47 It goes on to
promote equality of opportunity and treatment for migrant workers. 48
The UN adopted its migrant worker convention in 1990, but it took
more than a decade for it to enter into force. 49 The terms of the convention
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50. Id.
51. See Ratifications of C097 - Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97),
LABOUR
ORG.,
INT’L
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312242:NO (last visited September 8, 2016); Ratifications of C143 - Migrant Workers (SupplemenLABOUR
ORGANIZATION,
tary
Provisions)
Convention,
1975
(No. 143),
INT’L
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312288:NO (last visited September 8, 2016).
52. See United Nations Migrant Worker Convention art. 7, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 39481
[hereinafter Migrant Worker Convention]; ILO No. 97, supra note 2 art. 6; ILO No. 143, supra note 3
art. 10.
53. See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 17; ILO No. 143, supra note 3 art. 1.
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required at least twenty ratifications before going into force, so that a first
mover is not alone assuming obligations. Mostly migrant-sending countries
made up the first twenty ratifiers, a threshold achieved in 2003. This pattern has held in years since, when another twenty countries ratified the
convention, most of them likewise primarily sending countries. 50
Among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) member states, only Chile, Mexico and Turkey have ratified the
migrant labor convention. The total of forty is still far below the UN’s
nearly 200-country membership, compared with CEDAW and the CRC,
which have almost universal ratification (but not by the United States).
Ratification of the ILO migrant labor conventions is also characterized by
mostly sending-country approval: 49 countries have ratified Convention
No. 97, and 23 have ratified convention 143 (again, not including the United States). 51
Notwithstanding relatively low ratification levels, these instruments
reflect common international expectations as to how migrant workers
should be treated. The UN migrant worker convention and the two ILO
migrant labor conventions are long, dense, complex documents. This article
is not going to delve into their fine details. Rather, it synthesizes central
precepts and lay them alongside U.S. law, policy, and on-the-ground reality
to examine how treatment of migrant workers in the United States comports with global standards.
The international instruments on rights and protections of migrant
workers share these principles:
x Non-discrimination (i.e. on traditional grounds such as race,
sex, national origin, religion etc., separate from migration status); 52
x Humane treatment that respects the essential dignity of the
person; 53
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Document integrity ensuring that migrants maintain possession of or have immediate, unfettered access to their passports, work permits, visas, birth certificates or any other vital
personal document; 54
Regulated recruitment systems ensuring that workers are apprised of terms and conditions of employment under temporary work visas and that promised terms and conditions
become a reality, without workers having to pay excessive
fees, transportation costs, or bribes to get their visas and their
jobs; 55
Wages, conditions, and other terms of employment “not less
favorable” than those of co-workers who are “nationals”; 56
Freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to
bargain collectively; 57
Access to justice and remedy for injustice—migrant workers
should have legal recourse available to them for violations of
minimum labor standards under national law, violations of
contracted conditions of employment, or violations of terms
guaranteed by their work visas. 58
B. U.S. Law and Practice

Addressing each of these in turn, the following examples of ways in
which conditions for immigrant workers in the United States fail to live up
to international norms suggest that reform efforts might benefit from taking
into account and responding to these baseline standards.

Many immigrant workers face discrimination because of sex, race, national origin, religion and other grounds. For starters, foreign recruiters can
openly discriminate against workers seeking temporary visas for employment in the United States, based on the principle of non-extraterritorial
application of U.S. anti-discrimination statutes. 59

See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 21.
See Id. art. 66; ILO No. 97, supra note 2 at annex I-II.
See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 27.
See Id. art. 7; ILO No. 97, supra note 2 at art. 6; ILO No. 143, supra note 3 at art. 10.
See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 83.
See, e.g., Reyes-Gaona v. NCGA, 250 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 2001).
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Once here, many immigrant workers endure discrimination both blatant and disguised. 60 They and members of their families suffer economic,
social and health effects of discrimination in many areas. 61 Sexual harassment is an especially widespread abuse. 62 But discrimination can be subtler, too, as when resort operators employ young white East European and
Russian (mostly women) workers holding H-2 visas for “front-of-thehouse” contact with customers, while Mexican and Central Americans with
the same visas work in “back-of-the house” cooking and cleaning. In one
notable example, Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort hotel in Florida
spurned citizen job applicants in favor of H-2B visa holders from Eastern
Europe. 63
2. Humane treatment
Conditions for immigrant workers such as the welders from India in
the Signal International litigation and many household domestic employees
in anti-slavery prosecutions clearly run afoul of humane treatment requirements. One shocking example of non-conformance with the humane treatment standard is found in accounts of immigrant women in detention being
shackled to hospital beds while giving birth. 64 Beyond that, Amnesty International has documented pervasive problems with conditions of detention,
such as comingling of immigration detainees with individuals convicted of
criminal offenses; inappropriate and excessive use of restraints; inadequate
access to healthcare, including mental health services; inadequate access to
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60. See Griffith, supra note 23, at 126, 129, 134, 150-51, 161.
61. See Cecilia Ayón, Economic, Social, and Health Effects of Discrimination on Latino Immigrant
Families,
MIGRATION
POL’Y.
INST.
(September
2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/economic-social-and-health-effects-discrimination-latinoimmigrant-families (accessed February 19, 2016).
62. See, e.g., Irma Morales Waugh, Examining the Sexual Harassment Experiences of Mexican
Immigrant Farmworking Women, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 237, at 245–54 (2010); Grace Meng,
Cultivating Fear: The Vulnerability of Immigrant Farmworkers in the US to Sexual Violence and
RIGHTS
WATCH
(May
15
2012),
Sexual
Harassment,
HUMAN
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/15/cultivating-fear/vulnerability-immigrant-farmworkers-ussexual-violence-and-sexual; Sara Kominers, Working in Fear: Sexual Violence against Women Farmworkers in the United States: A Literature Review, OXFAM AM. (Apr. 16 2015),
https://www.northeastern.edu/law/pdfs/academics/phrge/kominers-report.pdf.
63. See Charles V. Bagli & Meghan Twohey, Foreign Labor Fills Vacancies at Trump Club, N.
Y. TIMES (February 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/politics/donald-trump-tapsforeign-work-force-for-his-florida-club.html.
64. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Settlement for a Shackled Pregnant Woman, N. Y. TIMES (October 17,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/us/settlement-for-a-shackled-pregnant-woman.html; Laura
Mills, Poor Housing, Wage Cheats still Plague Midwest Migrant Farm Workers, IOWAWATCH (December 30, 2013), http://investigatemidwest.org/2013/12/30/poor-housing-wage-cheats-still-plaguemidwest-migrant-farm-workers/ (accessed January 31, 2016).
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exercise; and denial of telephone access and other means of communication
with family members or advocates. 65
Other detention abuses include denial of family visitation, denial of
physical recreation, denial of telephone access, denial of access to legal
material and presentations by attorneys, denial of correspondence and other
mail, improper storage (and resulting loss) of funds and personal property,
abusive conditions in transfer from one facility to another, denial of toilet
facilities in hold rooms, and other egregious cases of inhumane treatment. 66
And remember, these are not criminal detainees.
3. Document integrity
Document integrity is a recurring problem for immigrant workers in
the United States. Crew leaders and employers often seize passports, birth
certificates and visas from H-2A and H-2B workers. 67 Diplomats, officials
of international organizations, international businessmen and other wealthy
employers of household domestic workers do likewise with workers holding with B-1, G-5 and A-3 “personal servant” visas. 68
Document confiscation puts employees in effective captivity. They are
already isolated in temporary employee housing quarters, usually with no
means of independent transportation. But without personal documents they
fear even to flee an abusive employer. 69
4. Regulated recruitment systems
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65. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA,
7
(March
25,
2009)
at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/usa-jailed-withoutjustice?page=show (accessed January 31, 2016).
66. See KAREN TUMLIN ET. AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES
U.S.
IMMIGRANT
DETENTION
CENTERS
73
(2009),
http://www.nilc.org/wpIN
content/uploads/2016/02/A-Broken-System-2009-07.pdf (accessed February 19, 2016).
67. See ETAN NEWMAN, NO WAY TO TREAT A GUEST: WHY THE H-2A AGRICULTURAL VISA
PROGRAM
FAILS
U.S.
AND
FOREIGN
WORKERS
33
(2011),
https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/7.2.a.6%20No%20Way%20To%20Tre
at%20A%20Guest%20H-2A%20Report.pdf (accessed January 31, 2016); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-154, H-2A AND H-2B VISA PROGRAMS: INCREASED PROTECTIONS
NEEDED FOR FOREIGN WORKERS, at 31, 36, 72 (2015).
68. See CAROL PIER, HIDDEN IN THE HOME: ABUSE OF DOMESTIC WORKERS WITH SPECIAL
VISAS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (June 2001), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/usadom), (accessed
January 31, 2016).
69. See Petula Dvorak, Woman escapes modern-day slavery in a home near the nation’s capital,
WASH. POST, April 15, 2013.
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providing information about a job, when required, such as wage level; or
providing false information about job conditions.” 70
Many workers take on high levels of debt to secure visas. For example, Filipino teachers recruited to work in Louisiana with H-1B visas were
charged $15,000 in recruitment fees and had to sign contracts forking over
10 percent of their salaries to the recruiting agency. 71 Nurses recruited to
work under H-1C “nursing shortage” visas often must sign contracts with
“breakage fees” in the tens of thousands of dollars if they leave before the
full contract period ends. 72 In many cases, they are hired and placed by
staffing agencies that contract their labor to hospitals at salaries far below
that of non-immigrant nurses. 73
A prominent U.S. recruiter was found to have manipulated the H-2B
visa program by bringing in thousands more workers than clients properly
sought. 74 Then he offered the surplus labor force to other employers (growers, landscapers, ski resort owners and more) and coached them on how to
discourage American workers from accepting job offers, thus circumventing the requirement to show a U.S. employee shortage. The recruiter instructed employers to hire a handful of token U.S. workers to game the
system. Then, they treated immigrant workers in vulnerable, abusive conditions as a surplus labor force that employers traded among themselves on
an as-needed basis. But the immigrant employees were always tied to the
H-2B visa and powerless to protest conditions or freely to seek other employment. 75
5. Equal treatment at work
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70. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 67 at [CITE].
71. See JENNIFER DORNING ET AL., AFL-CIO DEPT. PROF’L. EMP.,GAMING THE SYSTEM: GUEST
WORKER VISA PROGRAMS AND PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES, at
49 (2012), http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/Gaming-the-System-2012-Revised.pdf; CENTRO DE
LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE RECRUITMENT REVEALED: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN THE H-2
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM 49 (2013), http://www.cdmigrante.org/recruitment-revealedfundamental-flaws-in-the-h-2-temporary-worker-program-and-recommendations-for-change/.
72. See PATRICIA PITTMAN ET. AL., U.S.-BASED INTERNATIONAL NURSE RECRUITMENT:
AND
PRACTICES
OF
A
BURGEONING
INDUSTRY
22
(2007),
STRUCTURE
https://www.macfound.org/media/article_pdfs/NURSING_CODE_RESEARCHREPORTYR1.PDF.
73. Id.
74. See Ken Bensinger et al., The Coyote, BUZZFEED NEWS, December 29, 2015,
http://www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/the-coyote#.xa6OdoEBV.
75. Id.
76. See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 26.
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standards. Meatpackers’ wages remained substantially higher than the average manufacturing sector wage into the early 1980s. But then, they reversed course and entered into a long decline. 82
Meatpacking workers’ wages and conditions declined in tandem with
the industry’s move away from urban factory settings to the countryside,
accompanied by stepped-up recruiting of immigrant workers and treating
them contrary to the “not less favorable” international standard. 83 Unlike
workers in many U.S. manufacturing sectors, most meat and poultry workers do not face employers’ threats to move their plants to other countries
where wages and workers are suppressed. 84 Large quantities of meat are
heavy and bulky to ship long distances by air or sea, and the perishable
nature of these products usually requires that high volume, mass-market
production take place within quick reach of retail outlets.
But this did not block a “Third World” strategy by the U.S. meat and
poultry industry. Instead of exporting production to developing countries
for low labor costs, lax health, safety and environmental enforcement, and
vulnerable, exploited workers, U.S. meat and poultry companies essentially
are reproducing developing country employment conditions with immigrant workers here. 85
Downward pressure on wages and conditions is not limited to lowwage sectors. One exposé notes:
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82. For an overall historical review and discussion, see generally essays in SHELTON
STROMQUIST AND MARVIN BERGMAN, UNIONIZING THE JUNGLES: LABOR AND COMMUNITY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY MEATPACKING INDUSTRY (University of Iowa Press 1997).
83. See DONALD D. STULL, ON THE CUTTING EDGE: CHANGES IN MIDWESTERN MEATPACKING
COMMUNITIES 13 (1st ed. 1997); Michael J. Broadway, From City to Countryside: Recent Changes in
the Structure and Location of the Meat- and Fish-Processing Industries, in ANY WAY YOU CUT IT:
MEAT PROCESSING AND SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 17, 37 (Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway &
David Griffith eds., 1995); Alexander Stuart, Meatpackers in Stampede, FORTUNE, June 29, 1981, at 67.
84. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, We’ll Close! Plant Closings, Plant-closing Threats, Union
Organizing and NAFTA, 18 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, no. 3, 1997, at 8,
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cbpubs/17/.
85. See, e.g, OXFAM AMERICA, LIVES ON THE LINE: THE HUMAN COST OF CHEAP CHICKEN 7–8
(2015), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Lives_on_the_Line_Full_Report_Final.pdf;
TED GENOWAYS, THE CHAIN: FARM FACTORY & THE FATE OF OUR FOOD 34 (2014); Ted Genoways,
The Spam Factory’s Dirty Secret: First, Hormel Gutted the Union. Then it Sped Up the Line. And When
the Pig-Brain Machine Made Workers Sick, they Got Canned, MOTHER JONES, July 2011,
http://www.motherjones.com/print/115121 (last visited February 5, 2016).
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Under federal rules, employers like TCS, Infosys and Wipro that have
large numbers of H-1B workers in the United States are required to declare that they will not displace American workers. But the companies
are exempt from that requirement if the H-1B workers are paid at least
$60,000 a year. H-1B workers at outsourcing firms often receive wages
at or slightly above $60,000, below what skilled American technology
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professionals tend to earn, so those firms can offer services to American
companies at a lower cost, undercutting American workers. 86

6. Freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to bargain collectively
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86. See Haeyoun Park, How Outsourcing Companies Are Gaming the Visa System, N.Y. TIMES,
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/06/us/outsourcing-companies-dominateh1b-visas.html.
87. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).
88. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 890 (1984); NLRB v. Kolkka, 170 F.3d 937, 941
(9th Cir. 1999); Concrete Form Walls, Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. 831, 833 (2006); Agri-Processor Co., Inc. v.
NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
89. See Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should “Agricultural Laborers” Continue to be
Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 EMORY L.J. 489, 500 (1997); U.S. DEP’T. OF
LABOR, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY (UNDATED), DATA TABLES, “NATIONAL
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS,” table 1, at https://www.doleta.gov/agworker/naws.cfm (SEE EXCEL
FILE “HIRED CROP WORKER DEMOGRAPHICS, NATIONAL ESTIMATES, FIVE TIME PERIODS”).
90. See Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 890; Kolkka, 170 F.3d at 941; Concrete Form Walls, Inc., 346
N.L.R.B. at 833 (Apr. 13, 2006); Agri-Processor Co., Inc., 514 F.3d at 3–4.
91. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
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With an important exception, immigrant workers—even undocumented—are covered by most labor and employments laws to the same extent as
American workers, 87 including coverage under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). 88 It should be noted, though, that the exclusion of
agricultural employees from coverage of the NLRA has a disproportionate
effect on immigrant workers, who comprise an estimated three-fourths of
the farm labor force. 89 This means that, except in a handful of states with
agricultural labor relations acts (notably California), farm workers can suffer discrimination for union activity without recourse—a clear violation of
international standards.
It should be unremarkable that immigrants lawfully working thanks to
visas, green cards or other work permits are covered by the NLRA. But
coverage also extends to undocumented immigrant workers. They have the
same rights as documented immigrants and U.S. workers to join unions,
vote in NLRB elections, and benefit from collective bargaining agreements. 90 This is as it should be: if they were not, employers’ “divide and
conquer” policies would undermine organizing and collective bargaining
rights of all workers.
The significant legal exception arises in connection with remedies. In
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the Supreme Court held five-to-four that an
undocumented worker, because of his immigration status, was not entitled
to back pay for lost wages after he was illegally fired for union organizing. 91 The five-justice majority said that enforcing immigration law takes
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precedence over enforcing labor law. A powerful dissent argued that there
was not such a conflict and that a “backpay order will not interfere with the
implementation of immigration policy. Rather, it reasonably helps to deter
unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent.” 92 The dissenters went on to say:
Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides, the
Board can impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating
employers—for it has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal. And in
the absence of the backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they
can violate the labor laws at least once with impunity. Hence the backpay remedy is necessary; it helps make labor law enforcement credible;
it makes clear that violating the labor laws will not pay . . . To deny the
Board the power to award backpay. . .lowers the cost to the employer of
an initial labor law violation (provided, of course, that the only victims
are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the employer’s incentive to find
and to hire illegal-alien employees. Were the Board forbidden to assess
backpay against a knowing employer—a circumstance not before us today—this perverse economic incentive, which runs directly contrary to
the immigration statute’s basic objective, would be obvious and serious. 93
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92. Id. at 153.
93. Id. at 154–57.
94. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc. 357 N.L.R.B. 377, 377 (2011).
95. Id. at 380.
96. See Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 497, 511 (2004).
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The “obvious and serious” shoe dropped in Mezonos Maven Bakery,
when the NLRB ruled that Hoffman further required a denial of backpay to
workers fired for union activity even where their undocumented status was
known to the employer at the time of hiring. 94 Two Board members felt
bound by Hoffman, but noted that “in addition to the obvious failure to
make employee-victims whole—the Act’s enforcement is undermined,
employees are chilled in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, the workforce is fragmented, and a vital check on workplace abuses is removed.” 95
As a result, unscrupulous employers can hire undocumented workers and
discriminate against them for exercising the right to freedom of association
with total impunity.
The Hoffman decision sparked immediate worry that undocumented
workers might be denied all forms of backpay for any labor or employment
law violation. 96 It appears that backpay awards for work actually performed
(as with minimum wage or overtime pay violations) remain available to
undocumented workers. But other forms of compensation—such as workers’ compensation or damage awards for sexual harassment and other dis-
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97. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 1361, 1370 (2009).
98. See Int’l Labour Org. Comm. On Freedom of Ass’n, Rep. in which the Com. Requests to be
Kept Informed on Dev., ¶ 610 Rep. No. 332 (2003).
99. Id. at ¶ 613.
100. See Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrant Workers, Advisory Opinion
OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 1 (September 17, 2003).
101. Id. at ¶ 136. For a summary discussion, see NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, FACTS
ABOUT THE HOFFMAN CASE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
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crimination abuses, anti-retaliation remedies, and others—are subject to a
patchwork of court decisions in different jurisdictions, some favorable and
some unfavorable to immigrant workers. 97
The American labor movement tested the Hoffman decision in an international forum. In November 2003, the International Labour Organization Committee on Freedom of Association declared that the Hoffman
doctrine violates international legal obligations to protect workers’ organizing rights. The Committee concluded that “the remedial measures left to
the NLRB in cases of illegal dismissals of undocumented workers are inadequate to ensure effective protection against acts of anti-union discrimination.” 98
The ILO Committee recommended congressional action to bring U.S.
law “into conformity with freedom of association principles, in full consultation with the social partners concerned, with the aim of ensuring effective
protection for all workers against acts of anti-union discrimination in the
wake of the Hoffman decision.” 99 Of course, the ILO has no enforcement
authority and the United States has no legal obligation to implement ILO
recommendations.
Besides the ILO, another international human rights tribunal took up
the Hoffman issue. Joined by immigrant worker advocates in the United
States, Mexico petitioned the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for an
advisory opinion on U.S. treatment of immigrant workers. 100
In its opinion, the Inter-American Court said that undocumented
workers are entitled to the same labor rights, including wages owed, protection from discrimination, protection for health and safety on the job, and
back pay, as are citizens and those working lawfully in a country. The
Court said that despite their irregular status “[I]f undocumented migrants
are engaged, they immediately become possessors of the labor rights corresponding to workers . . . This is very important, because one of the principal problems that occurs in the context of immigration is that migrant
workers who lack permission to work are engaged in unfavorable conditions compared to other workers.” 101
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7. Recourse and remedy
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RIGHTS HEARING (Mar. 3, 2005), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/facts-about-thehoffman-case-and-international-law.pdf.
102. See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 83.
103. See 45 C.F.R. § 1626.1 (2016); for discussion, see generally ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES AN UPDATE FOR 2013 6 (2013), http://www.clasp.org/resourcesand-publications/publication-1/CIVIL-LEGAL-AID-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES-3.pdf;
LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION, ABOUT STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LSC-FUNDED PROGRAMS, (noting
“with limited exceptions such as lawful permanent residents, H2A agricultural workers, H2B forestry
workers, and victims of battering, extreme cruelty, sexual assault or trafficking”),
http://www.lsc.gov/about-statutory-restrictions-lsc-funded-programs (last visited Sep. 26, 2016).
104. For discussion, see Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker
and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006).
105. See MARY BAUER, CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(2013),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/SPLCClose-to-Slavery-2013.pdf.
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Under principles common to the UN migrant worker convention and
the two ILO instruments, workers should be able to turn to labor and employment law enforcement agencies and to the judicial system for violations of their rights and protections under national law. 102 As a threshold
problem, most immigrant workers holding visas are ineligible for federal or
state-funded legal services for help with workplace violations. 103 They are
on their own to find a lawyer for assistance, and are likely to be turned
down unless a large class of employees can be created to pursue large-scale
financial remedies. The potential recovery for any single worker makes
taking a case financially unfeasible for most practicing attorneys, and individual employees cannot afford the attorney’s going rate.
Undocumented workers with potential claims face the same barriers
and more. Not making legal recourse and remedy available to immigrants
invites the emergence of an underclass of exploited and frightened workers,
putting enormous downward pressure on labor standards generally.
Keeping millions of undocumented workers “in the shadows” has exactly this effect. They might be covered by labor and employment laws, but
coverage by itself is useless if workers are afraid to even voice concerns
about working conditions or to file complaints with government agencies
because they are afraid that employers’ challenges to their immigration
status will expose them to deportation. 104
The “fear factor” is not limited to undocumented workers. Employees
with visas that tie them to a particular employer are also afraid to protest
conditions or assert their rights. The employer-specificity of temporary
work visas are the main reason that employment under such visas is often
described as a form of indentured servitude. 105 Employers can create a pretext to summarily fire visa-holding workers who protest conditions, which
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puts them immediately “out of status” and subject to deportation. 106 The
result is that many suffer in silence, with no place else to go. 107 Workers
who manage to bring wage and hour complaints often have to return home
before their cases are decided, creating a huge communication and logistics
problem for advocates handling their cases in U.S. proceedings. 108
IV. MIGRANT LABOR AND TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. NAFTA and Migrant Workers

03/01/2017 10:44:39

106. Id. at 1.
107. Id.at 16. Note some research suggests that the “indenture” case might be overstated for skilled
H-1B high-tech employees who manage to move from firm-to-firm, especially when overall unemployment is low. See Briggs Depew et al., Inter-firm Mobility and Return Migration Patterns of Skilled
Guest Workers, J. POPUL ECON. 1 (August 2016), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00148-0160607-y/fulltext.html?view=classic.
108. See NAN SCHIVONE, GLOBAL WORKERS JUSTICE ALLIANCE, CHALLENGES IN
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: REPRESENTING ABSENTEE MIGRANT WORKERS IN U.S. COURTS (4th Ed.
2014)
at
http://www.globalworkers.org/sites/default/files/4th%20Ed_Challenges%20in%20Transnational%20Lit
igation_2014%28WEB%29_0.pdf (table of contents accessed February 9, 2016; full text available as
hard copy upon request to Global Workers Justice Alliance).
109. See NAFTA, supra note 5, at 664–67; TN Visa — North American Free Trade Agreement for
OF
MICH.
INT’L
CTR.,
Canadian
and
Mexican
Citizens,
UNIV.
http://internationalcenter.umich.edu/immig/tnvisa/.
110. See MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW THE DEAL
WAS DONE 110 (2002).
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Another international angle of approach to migrant labor law and policy arises in trade agreements negotiated by the United States with commercial partners and related labor provisions in such agreements. The chief
example is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its
supplemental North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC).
Negotiated in the early 1990s, NAFTA created a new visa category
called the TN visa for business and professional employees entering the
United States for temporary work. 109 However, NAFTA stopped there.
Rebuffing Mexico’s request, the United States ruled out any fartherreaching immigration provisions in NAFTA (just as Mexico refused to
negotiate over its energy reserves and Canada refused to negotiate over its
protected cultural sector; for each of the three countries, its jealously
guarded issue was “off-the-table” in NAFTA negotiations). 110
To obtain a TN visa, an applicant has to hold a university degree and
demonstrate “business activity at a professional level” in one of sixty business, medical, scientific and educational professions listed in a NAFTA
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annex, starting with A for accountant and ending with Z for zoologist. 111
The TN visa program has been relatively uncontroversial, compared with
the H-1B and L visa programs for professionals and highly-skilled employees and recurring exposés about their misuse by employers. 112 The TN
program is sufficiently narrow, and the volume of trade among the three
NAFTA countries is sufficiently large, that TN visa holders mostly fly
under the radar of immigrations concerns. They mostly come for short
stays, not for long-term employment in the United States. 113
B. The NAALC, Labor Principle 11, and Complaints and Cases

03/01/2017 10:44:39

111. 8 C.F.R. § 214.6 (2016).
112. See, e.g., Jacob T. Muklewicz, The TN visa category: An oasis in the Desert of Dried up
International
talent
pools,
INSIDE
COUNSEL,
May
15,
2015,
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/05/15/the-tn-visa-category-an-oasis-in-the-desert-of-dri.
113. See Elizabeth M. Grieco, Length of Visit of Nonimmigrants Departing the United States in
2003 6, tbl. 6, (Dep’t of Homeland Security, Off. of Immigr. Stat. Working Paper, Mar. 2005),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/LengthVstNonim2003.pdf (87 percent of TN
visa holders stayed less than one year).
114. See NAALC, supra note 7, art. 52. Another side agreement took shape in the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993); for
a discussion of the side agreements, see Cameron and Tomlin, supra note 110.
115. NAALC, supra note 7 annex I, princ. 11,
116. National Union of Workers (“UNT”) et al., Mexico NAO Submission 9802 (Apple Growers),
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR - BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS (May 27, 1998), at
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/mx_9802_apple_growers_submission.pdf.
For
official
documentation in all cases, see Submissions under the North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
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NAFTA went no farther on immigration, but the three countries took
up migrant labor concerns in the supplemental North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), one of two “side agreements” negotiated
in 1993 after Bill Clinton took office. 114
The NAALC defined eleven “labor principles” that the United States,
Mexico and Canada parties pledged to promote. In Labor Principle 11 on
protection of migrant workers, they agreed to promote the principle of
“[p]roviding migrant workers in a Party’s territory with the same legal
protection as the Party’s nationals in respect of working conditions.” 115
Trade unions, human rights groups, and other labor advocates in North
America have made extensive use of the NAALC’s complaint mechanism
to target exploitative treatment of Mexican migrant workers in the United
States. In examining these cases, one must keep in mind that the NAALC
did not create an adjudicatory system. It is rather a “soft law” procedure
making use of reviews, investigations, research, public hearings, reports,
recommendations, consultations, action plans, and the like. Still, advocates’
creative use of the mechanism can bring concrete positive results. 116
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1. Washington State Apple Case
A coalition of Mexican trade unions and farmworker organizations
filed a wide-ranging NAALC complaint in May 1998 alleging failure of
U.S. labor law to protect migrant workers’ rights in the Washington State
apple industry. 117 Virtually all of the 50,000 workers who harvest apples
are immigrants from Mexico and Central America. 118
The submission cited the lack of legal protection for farmworker union organizing, widespread health and safety violations, discrimination
against immigrant workers, and employers’ use of threats and intimidation
in recent union representation elections in apple packing and shipping facilities. The complaint called on the Mexican government to invoke review
and consultation mechanisms under the NAALC. 119
A public hearing in Mexico City garnered widespread publicity in the
news media of both the United States and Mexico; Mexico’s secretary of
labor formally requested ministerial consultations with the U.S. secretary of
labor. This development sparked a new round of publicity and related attention to the conditions of immigrant workers in the industry. 120
In May 2000, the governments announced a program of events resulting from the consultations, including a public forum for workers, unions,
employers and government officials and an “outreach” effort by labor law
enforcement personnel. 121 On the ground, it led to improvements in housing conditions, piecework rate calculations, and health and safety enforcement. 122
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tion (NAALC), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS at
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm (filter list by “Mexico”) (last visited Sept. 21,
2016). See also Tamara Kay, NAFTA and the Politics of Labor Transnationalism (2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, U.C., Berkeley).
117. See Steven Greenhouse, Mexicans Were Denied U.S. Rights, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES May 28,
1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/28/us/mexicans-were-denied-us-rights-suit-says.html.
118. See Lynda V. Mapes, Needed but Often Illegal, they Pick our Crops, Pine for Home, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 18, 2000, http://old.seattletimes.com/special/mexico/stories/mex1a.html; Matthew Geyman
et al., Indigenous Guatemalan and Mexican Workers in Washington State: Living Conditions and Legal
LAW
REV.
1
(2012),
Issues,
5
MEX.
http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-05782012000200002.
119. See UNT et al., supra note 116.
120. See, e.g., Molly Moore, Mexican Farmhands Accuse U.S. Firms: Panel Hears Washington
Apple Pickers, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at A36.
121. See Alexis M. Herman & Mariano Palacios Alcocer, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR - BUREAU OF
INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, Ministerial Consultations - Mexico Submissions 9801, 9802 and 9803 (May 18,
2000), at http://www.naalc.org/english/pdf/pubcomm/minagr_mex1998_01_02_03_en.pdf.
122. Interviews with United Farm Workers union representatives (2001–2002).
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2. North Carolina H-2A Case
In February 2003, advocates filed a complaint alleging that the United
States failed to protect the rights of Mexican migrant agricultural workers
recruited to work in the state of North Carolina through the H-2A visa program. 123 North Carolina was (and still is) the biggest single state with H-2A
visa workers, with some 10,000 migrants coming under the program. 124
Complainants argued that employers restricted H-2A workers’ access
to union organizers, service providers, and legal aid attorneys; denied H-2A
workers medical care and access to compensation for on-the job injuries;
blacklisted workers from participating in the program if they file complaints about on-the-job injuries or unpaid wages; refused to hire women or
workers over a certain age; and manipulated the growing season and forced
workers to sign voluntary resignations in order to avoid paying required
travel and other expenses. 125
Thanks in part to the international spotlight of the NAALC complaint
process, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) gained union
recognition from the North Carolina Growers Association and has successfully negotiated a series of contracts. 126
3. Carnival Workers H-2B Case

03/01/2017 10:44:39

123. See Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos & Farmworker Justice Fund,
Inc., Mexico NAO Submission 2003-1 (North Carolina), U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR - BUREAU OF INT’L
LABOR AFFAIRS (Feb. 11, 2003), at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/mx_200301_carolina_submission.pdf [hereinafter Mexico NAO Submission 2003-1].
124. See H-2A Temporary Agricultural Visa Program, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR - OFF. OF FOREIGN
LABOR CERTIFICATION (2012),
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/h_2a_selected_statistics.pdf; H-2A Workers in the United
States – Data: Top Ten States of Employment 2012, GLOB. WORKERS JUSTICE ALL.,
http://globalworkers.org/iii-h-2a-workers-us-%E2%80%93-figures (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
125. Mexico NAO Submission 2003-1, supra note 123. See also Meier, supra note 24.
126. See Organizing the South, FARM LABOR ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (“FLOC”),
http://www.floc.com/wordpress/cross-border-organizing/north-carolina-organizing/ (last visited Sept.
21, 2016).
127. See Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc. et al., Mexico Submission 2011-1 (H-2B Visa
Workers), U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR - BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS (Sept. 19, 2011),
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/mx_2011-01_h2b_submission.pdf.
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In September 2011, migrant worker advocacy groups filed a complaint
arguing that the U.S. government had failed to comply with its obligations
under the NAALC to effectively enforce labor laws with respect to migrants working in the carnival and fair industry under H-2B visas. 127 The
individual migrant workers were originally from the Mexican states of
Zacatecas and Veracruz and worked for J&J Amusements, Inc. and
Reithoffer Shows, Inc. in the U.S. from 2007 to 2009.
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This new form of immigrant worker advocacy emerged in 2008 through
the creation of the annual Labor Rights Week (LRW), which is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The LRW is executed through dozens
of individual regional agreements between local regulatory agencies and
Mexican consulate offices at the state level. Made possible in large part
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128. Id.
129. See MEXICAN SECRETARIAT OF LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE, REPORT ON THE REVIEW BY
THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF MEXICO OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS MEX 2003-1 AND
MEX 2011-1 PURSUANT TO THE NAALC (UNOFFICIAL DOL TRANSLATION) 75 (2012),
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/mx_report_eng.pdf.
130. See U.S. Response to Mexico’s Request for Migrant Worker Outreach, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR
- BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS (April 3, 2014), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/preferenceprograms/US-Mexico.htm.
131. For discussion, see Top 10 CDM Victories, CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE (Sept.
2015), http://www.cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Top-10-CDM-Victories.pdf (#9: Urging government accountability through binational advocacy).
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The complainants alleged that 1) the U.S. government allowed carnival and fair industry employers of workers with H-2B visas to deny their
employees minimum wage and overtime payments; 2) the U.S. government
failed to conduct inspections of traveling carnivals and fairs that employed
H-2B workers; 3) the U.S. government failed to enforce requirements that
H-2B workers be reimbursed for pre-employment visa-related and travel
expenses; 4) the U.S. government failed to prevent employers’ illegally
withholding a portion of the workers’ pay to ensure they stay for the entire
period of temporary employment and requiring workers to purchase $100
uniforms; and finally 5)
H-2B visa workers and other migrant workers have a difficult time accessing administrative and judicial resources because they work in industries that require them to work seven days a week and travel from place to
place. 128
In November 2012, Mexico issued a bold critique of U.S. labor laws
and policies governing migrant workers. 129 In April 2014, Secretary of
Labor Thomas E. Perez and his Mexican counterpart issued a detailed Ministerial Declaration to address the issues raised in all the NAALC complaints on migrant workers. Their plan for extensive outreach, education,
and enforcement is now underway. 130
This review of migrant labor complaints under the NAFTA labor
agreement suggests that the international “not less favorable” norm embodied in a trade agreement can influence policy steps within the United States.
It did not have the effect of changing immigration law, but it spurred a
response by the government in several areas that led to improved conditions for migrants. 131 As Xóchitl Bada and Shannon Gleeson note:
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by a 2004 federal memorandum of understanding between the Mexican
Secretary of Foreign of Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of Labor, as well
as several subsequent accords with other agencies, the annual LRW represents the institutionalization of a binational partnership that may be
characterized as what Amengual and Fine (2013) refer to as a “model of
transnationally coproduced regulatory enforcement of labor standards.” 132

C. Post-NAFTA Migrant Labor Omissions
Unfortunately, in post-NAFTA trade agreements’ labor chapters, the
United States has moved away from addressing migrant labor concerns.
Starting with the U.S.-Jordan agreement of 2002 and continuing through
trade agreements with Central American countries, Peru, Korea, Colombia
and others, and now in the much-debated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
trade agreement, the United States dropped the NAALC labor principle on
protection of migrant workers’ rights. Instead, U.S. focus turned to ILO
core labor standards (on freedom of association, forced labor, child labor
and discrimination) and what the agreements call “acceptable conditions”
on wages, hours, and health and safety at work. 133 These clauses should
apply equally to migrant workers, but the post-NAFTA accords are silent
on this point.
Labor migration is a global phenomenon, but the NAALC remains the
only labor-trade agreement that includes protection for migrant workers.
TPP negotiators have not said whether NAFTA and the NAALC will survive and remain in effect alongside the TPP, or whether they will be completely supplanted by the Trans-Pacific pact. 134 If the NAALC survives, it
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 126 Side B
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132. See Xóchitl Bada & Shannon Gleeson, A New Approach to Migrant Labor Rights Enforcement: The Crisis of Undocumented Worker Abuse and Mexican Consular Advocacy in the United
States, 40 LAB. STUD. J. 32, 34 (2015), citing Matthew Amengual and Janice Fine, Co-enforcing Labor
Standards: The Unique Contributions of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and the United
&
GOVERNANCE
(June
24,
2106),
at
States,
in
REGULATION
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12122/abstract.
133. See, e.g., U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 16, Aug. 5,
2004, 43 I.L.M. 514,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file320_3936.pdf (noting in
Article 16.1, “The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor Organization
(ILO) and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration)” and Article 16.8, “acceptable conditions of work
with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health,” and similar language in labor chapters of other U.S. trade agreements. Post-NAFTA/NAALC trade agreements are
silent on rights of immigrant workers. See all at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements.)
134. The U.S. Trade Representative says only it will “upgrade” NAFTA; see TPP: Upgrading the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading-the-North-American-Free-Trade-AgreementNAFTA-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
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is unclear whether advocates will still be able to invoke its labor principle
on protection of migrant workers, which in any case would only involve the
three original NAFTA parties. 135
Preserving this feature of the NAALC for only three countries is not
enough. While it now appears to be a moot point in light of the incoming
administration’s stated intention to “tear up” the TPP and renegotiate other
trade agreements such as NAFTA, 136 labor advocates should continue to
insist that the NAALC’s signature feature on protection of migrant workers’ rights be included in any newly-negotiated trade agreements and
strengthened in any re-drawn agreements.
V. TURNING TO A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH
A. Diffusing Frames
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135. The author asked a U.S. Department of Labor official about this in a May 2016 exchange that
the official requested be off-the-record; the response was “we don’t know.”
136. See David Nakamura and Ylan Q. Mui, “Donald Trump promised to rip up trade deals. TPP is
the
first
casualty.”
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
11,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/11/donald-trump-promised-to-rip-up-tradedeals-tpp-is-the-first-casualty/.
137. See, e.g., ILO No. 97, supra note 2 art. 6; ILO No. 143, supra note 3 art. 10 (committing state
to protect migrant workers “lawfully within its territory”).
138. See, e.g., ILO No. 143, supra note 3 art. 6 (committing states to “the application of administrative, civil and penal sanctions, which include imprisonment in their range, in respect of the illegal
employment of migrant workers.”).
139. See Rachel Cassidy, Involuntary and Voluntary Migrant Estimates (2005) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.copafs.org/UserFiles/file/seminars/methodology_and_data_quality/Involuntary%20and%20
Voluntary%20Migarant%20Estimates.pdf (noting “there were 3,523,262 involuntary migrants and
27,210,764 voluntary migrants identified in Census 2000”).
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Discussion and advocacy of international standards on migrant workers does not mean to suggest that UN and ILO conventions have all the
answers and are free of shortcomings. For one thing, they offer most of
their protections to workers who obtain visas or work permits. 137 They
assume that workers who migrate without documents are all trafficking
victims who should be liberated and returned home, while those who employ them should be criminally prosecuted and punished. 138
Reality of course is different. “Push” effects in sending countries and
“pull effects” in receiving countries make most undocumented migration
voluntary, with millions of workers seeking opportunities for better lives
than they contemplate at home. 139 The challenge in the United States is to
recognize reality and recognize the many positive contributions of immi-

38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 127 Side B

03/01/2017 10:44:39

8 COMPA MACRO EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

240

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

1/30/2017 7:49 PM

[Vol 92:1

grant workers to our economy and society, and to forge a means of regularizing their situation within a context of respect for human rights.
Can using a human rights frame advance this process? Extensive literature describes how diffusion of international human rights norms slowly
permeates and changes domestic legal regimes in countries transitioning
from dictatorship to democracy. 140 Less common is analysis and advocacy
on incorporating international standards into U.S. law and practice. But
several knowledgeable immigration specialists have confronted this question and offered compelling arguments for undertaking such an effort.
Kati Griffith says:
[M]igrant workers may also have some recourse in international arenas
such as the International Labor Organization, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, and the National Office of Administration of the North
American Agreement on Free Trade. These avenues are sometimes limited because of the failure of the United States to sign treaties that may
be helpful to migrant workers and because the domestic enforcement of
international standards is often difficult . . . [I]nternational bodies largely
do not have an ability to reach specific employers in the United States.
Even when international law cannot directly reach employers in the
United States, however, international legal challenges often provide political pressure that may help migrant workers more broadly and international laws can serve as a source of “aspirational law” for the future. 141

Canadian colleague Judy Fudge argues:

Leslie Wexler of Illinois Law School suggests that viewing migrant
labor policy through a human rights lens can overcome “moral disengagement” by people who fail to recognize the human condition of migrants. It
can also contribute to formation and dissemination of best practices among
receiving countries and ultimately lead to legislative change. 143
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140. See, e.g., THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE
(Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
141. Griffith, supra note 23, at 154.
142. See Judy Fudge, Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox of
International Rights for Migrant Workers, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 95, 96 (2012) (footnote omitted).
143. See Lesley Wexler, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in Addressing
Immigration, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 359, 391 (2007).
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On their face, international human rights norms offer a more promising
avenue for protecting migrant workers from precarious employment than
do claims based upon citizenship, a formal legal status that migrant
workers do not enjoy in the state in which they are working. Human
rights, by contrast, are invoked and apply on the basis of humanity and
personhood, a much broader status that does not depend upon political
membership in the host state. 142
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Beth Lyon argues that “the U.N. Migrant Worker Convention, dismissed by this [the United States] and other migrant-receiving countries for
nearly two decades as a political non-starter, provides a rational approach
to labor migration that deserves meaningful examination by the United
States . . . because it would inject into domestic debates the notion that
immigrant workers, including unauthorized workers, are subjects of human
rights protection.” 144
Prof. Lyon goes on to suggest areas in which international standards
embodied in the U.N. Convention could affect U.S. law, policy, and discourse:
x Engaging with the Convention would shift the political climate toward policy reform by keeping human rights concerns
front and center in discourse and debates;
x Ratification of the Convention would advance foreign policy
goals of strengthening relations with Mexico and with developing countries generally, enabling the United States to shape
the development of emerging international law standards on
immigrant workers;
x Engaging with the Convention would educate U.S. officials
on best practices in labor migration and promote policy coherence among the many federal agencies that deal with migrant
labor issues;
x A campaign to ratify the Convention would signal a meaningful shift in modality for U.S. migrant workers and their advo38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 128 Side A
03/01/2017 10:44:39

144. See Beth Lyon, The Unsigned United Nations Migrant Worker Rights Convention: An Overlooked Opportunity to Change the “Brown Collar” Migration Paradigm, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
389, 393 (2010) [hereinafter Lyon, Brown Collar]; see also Beth Lyon, Changing Tactics: Globalization and the U.S. Immigrant Worker Rights Movement, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 161 (2008)
[hereinafter Lyon, Changing Tactics]; Beth Lyon, Tipping the Balance: Why Courts Should Look to
International and Foreign Law on Unauthorized Immigrant Worker Rights, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 169
(2007) [hereinafter Lyon, Tipping the Balance]; David Weissbrodt, Remedies for Undocumented
Noncitizens in the Workplace: Using International Law to Narrow the Holding of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1424 (2008); Ryszard Cholewinski, The Human and
Labor Rights of Migrants: Visions of Equality, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 177 (Winter 2008); Rebecca
Smith, Human Rights at Home: Human Rights as an Organizing and Legal Tool in Low-Wage Worker
Communities, 3 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 285 (2007); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms
on Migration: Substance without Architecture, in INT’L MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS
AND KEY CHALLENGES 467 (Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007); Connie de la Vega & Conchita
Lozano, Advocates Should Use Applicable International Standards to Address Violations of Undocumented Migrant Workers’ Rights in the United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 35 (Fall
2005).
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cates, requiring that they articulate and justify a broad range
of international standards for domestic audiences. 145
Change will be incremental. Migrant labor and human rights advocates still confront general unawareness in the United States of international human rights standards and of the ILO’s work in giving precise meaning
to those standards. 146 Advocates still have an enormous educational challenge of making them more widely known and respected.
But the fact that international human rights arguments strain for a
place in American political discourse is not a reason to shy away from their
use. It is a reason to bring human rights into the discourse to connect with a
natural sense of “rights” that all people share.
The human rights argument pries open more space for advocacy on
behalf of migrant workers and for rights-based reforms. It frames advocacy
as a human rights mission, not defending “illegal aliens” or, more mundanely, seeking to raise or lower the numerical cap on H-1B visas or the
Adverse Effect Wage Rate.
D. Informing the Judiciary
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145. See generally Lyon, Brown Collar, supra note 144, at 495; Lyon, Changing Tactics, supra
note 144; Lyon, Tipping the Balance, supra note 144; Weissbrodt, supra note 144; Cholewinski, supra
note 144; Smith, supra note 144; Aleinikoff, supra note 144; de la Vega & Lozano, supra note 144.
146. Estlund, supra note 42 at 1589–90; see also AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2005).
147. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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One possible approach pertinent for practitioners to consider is including international human rights arguments in complaints, trial briefs and
appeal briefs in litigating immigrant worker cases. Consider too having
expert witnesses testify about international standards on migrant workers.
Granted it is difficult, especially at the district court level. Applying
U.S. law is complicated enough; introducing international law puts frontline judges into mostly unfamiliar and uncomfortable territory. But this is
why human rights should be raised at the trial level: so that on appeal circuit courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, can begin to fashion analytical approaches that guide lower judges and courts.
This is not so far-fetched. In Roper v. Simmons, in which the Court
ruled unconstitutional the death penalty for juvenile offenders, Justice Scalia railed against consideration of international norms, saying “the views of
other countries and the so-called international community . . . [and the]
argument[ ]that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world[ ]ought to be rejected out of hand.” 147
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But Scalia was dissenting. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion noted:
[T]he Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” . . . It is proper
that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty . . . The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions. 148

Justice Breyer has elaborated on this view in a recent book, saying:
[C]ritics worry that . . . our judiciary will come to substitute foreign legal
concepts and values for those upon which Americans have long built
their lives . . . [T]he demands of the Court’s work make impossible the
sort of hermetically sealed legal system some might imagine America
able to sustain . . . [I]f potential for influence exists in our engagement
with the legal world beyond our shores, it is far likelier to be our influence on international law . . . than foreign influence on American
law . . . By engaging the world and the borderless challenges it presents,
we can promote adherence to and the adoption of those basic constitutional and legal values for which the Court and the Constitution
stand . . . 149

E. Reform Proposals
In the policy arena, the United States should consider reform measures
that will reflect international human rights standards alongside homegrown
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148. Id. at 574, 577 (majority opinion).
149. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL
REALITIES 246, 248 (2015).
150. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, String of Attacks in Europe Fuels a Summer of Anxiety, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/world/europe/string-of-attacks-in-europefuels-a-summer-of-anxiety.html?_r=0; Dan Bilefsky, Fatal Beating of Polish Man Fuels Debate Over
Xenophobia in Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/world/europe/britain-polish-man-killed-brexit.html.
151. See Houseman, supra note 103; Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrant
Workers, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 1 (September 17, 2003).;
45 C.F.R. § 1626.1 (2016).
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Anti-immigrant sentiment and attacks are increasing around the
world. 150 Instead, the United States should seek to promote values suggested by Justice Breyer by applying human rights standards and principles to
treatment of migrant workers in U.S. law and policy. Perhaps, for example,
in a case reprising the question of remedies for migrant workers unlawfully
fired for exercising rights of association, the Supreme Court might reconsider its decision in Hoffman Plastic and take into account recommendations of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. 151
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152. See Alexander Burns, Choice Words from Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES: FIRST DRAFT, June
16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/06/16/choice-words-from-donald-trumppresidential-candidate/; S.A. Miller, Ivanka Trump Wanted to Walk back Donald Trump’s Mexican
TIMES,
Aug.
13,
2016,
‘Rapists’
Comments:
Deposition,
WASH.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/13/ivanka-trump-wanted-walk-back-donald-trumpsmexica/.
153. John Nichols, Bush and Cruz Want to Use Religious Tests to Bar Refugees From the US, THE
NATION Nov. 17, 2015, https://www.thenation.com/article/republicans-want-to-use-religious-tests-tobar-refugees-from-the-us/.
154. Brian Bennett, Can Donald Trump really round up and deport 11 million people?, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-deport-20160822-snapstory.html.
155. Nick Gass, Conway: Trump focuses on wall because it’s ‘easy for people to understand’,
POLITICO, Aug. 30, 2016, http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/trump-wall-kellyanne-conway227546#ixzz4J2GZoyT8..
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values that do not brand migrants as criminals and rapists, 152 apply a religious test to reject migrants and refugees, 153 purport to round up and deport
eleven million people, 154 or build a wall on the border with a friend and
neighbor. 155
In this light, international human rights principles compel an immigration reform plan that provides:
x the application of international human rights standards to migrant workers’ living and working conditions;
x regularization of status and a path to citizenship for undocumented migrant workers and members of their families;
x safeguards against migrant labor being used to undermine
terms and conditions of employment for all workers;
x tighter control of temporary visa programs based on real
needs, coupled with an opportunity for temporary migrants to
obtain green cards, permanent residency, and a path toward
citizenship;
x where a genuine labor shortage exists (i.e. not one driven by
failure to offer good pay and benefits), salary guarantees for
migrant workers at prevailing wage levels, not artificially
suppressed pay;
x strong anti-blacklisting and anti-retaliation measures to protect migrant workers’ rights, including special visas and work
permits to remain in the country to pursue legal recourse;
x a temporary visa system that allows for free movement among
employers, thus ending the “virtual servitude” that marks current temporary visa programs tying the worker to one employer;
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a regulated temporary worker recruitment system ensuring
reasonable fees, registration and vetting of recruiters, full disclosure and transparency, enforceable individual contracts of
employment, document integrity, employer-paid travel expenses, and making employers where migrant workers actually apply their labor legally responsible for adherence to
international standards and legally liable for violations by recruiters and their agents; 156
migrant workers’ access to legal services on the same basis as
other low-income workers;
protection of migrant workers’ full freedom of association and
related rights to organize and to bargain collectively, including access to the full range of remedies when they are victimized by unlawful conduct.

This is an ambitious set of proposals. Achieving even a portion of
such reforms is a huge challenge not easily met. But at a time when noisy
political voices propose policies incorporating anti-immigrant racism, xenophobia, and intolerance, advocates should “go big” in defense of human
rights and migrant workers’ rights.
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156. For details on these proposals, see Jennifer Gordon, Global Labor Recruitment in a Supply
Chain Context (ILO Working Paper 2015), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-dgreports/—dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_377805.pdf.

